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Power-sharing in a re-united 
Cyprus: Centripetal coalitions 
vs. proportional sequential 
coalitions
John McGarry* and Neophytos Loizides**
Power-sharing coalitions in severely divided places can take centripetal or consociational 
forms. Respectively, these aim to foster moderation by restricting coalitions to moderate par-
ties from different ethnic communities or inclusivity by ensuring that coalitions are broadly 
and proportionately representative of  the main political forces. This article draws on the expe-
rience of  Cyprus to show the limits of  negotiating centripetal coalitions even under “most 
likely to succeed” conditions. It investigates a major centripetalist initiative on the island 
between 2008 and 2010, and explains why this failed to catalyze a negotiated settlement. 
Likewise, the article points to the limits of  classic consociational approaches in mediating 
power-sharing arrangements, particularly approaches that rely on corporate ethnic quotas. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom and much international practice, the article shows that 
consociational coalitions can take a liberal form that bypass such quotas. Specifically, the 
article presents and defends an important innovation in consociational theory and practice: 
the proportional sequential (PS) coalition. PS coalitions are automatically determined by 
election results, and allocate portfolios on a proportionate and liberal basis amongst a divided 
polity’s main political parties. We argue that PS coalitions can provide a broadly inclusive and 
negotiable settlement in the context of  a re-united Cyprus as well as in other divided polities.
1. Introduction
On May 15, 2015, the leaders of  Cyprus’s Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot com-
munities resumed negotiations on a comprehensive constitutional settlement of  the 
Cyprus problem. One of  the core issues in these negotiations is the composition of  the 
re-united Cyprus’s joint, or federal, executive. As both communities will have to ratify 
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any new settlement in separate and simultaneous referenda, any mutually acceptable 
executive will have to be based on power-sharing between the two sides. This leaves 
a number of  possibilities, but one of  the main choices will be between a centripetal 
coalition of  the moderate parties in each community, and a consociational grand 
coalition that includes all of  each communities’ main parties.1
There are many supporters of  a centripetal approach for Cyprus. These include the 
main leftist parties in each bloc, the Greek Cypriot AKEL and the Turkish Cypriot CTP; 
a prominent London-based think tank, the “Friends of  Cyprus”; a number of  academ-
ics;2 and substantial sections of  the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, 
both of  which are fearful of  allowing hardliners from the other community into gov-
ernment.3 All these supporters utilize arguments that are associated with the aca-
demic contribution of  Don Horowitz, the doyen of  centripetal theory, although they 
may never have read his work.4 Indeed, centripetalist proposals for power-sharing in 
Cyprus were put forward as early as the late 1960s in bicommunal negotiations pre-
ceding Horowitz’s early work.5 Centripetalists argue that coalitions of  moderate par-
ties are more likely to be agreed on than consociational grand coalitions that include 
parties from either extreme of  the bi-communal spectrum. Moderate coalitions are 
also thought to be more capable of  delivering functionality, because of  their greater 
propensity for cooperation.
In this article, we challenge centripetal theory and argue that a centripetal coalition 
is unlikely to be feasible or functional in Cyprus, or any other similarly divided polity. 
Instead, the paper proposes a novel kind of  consociational grand coalition based on a 
1 Donald Horowitz describes this choice as the “most fundamental” facing institutional designers in deeply 
divided places. Donald L.  Horowitz, The Agreement: Clear, Consociational and Risky, in NortherN IrelaNd 
aNd the dIvIded World: Post-agreemeNt NortherN IrelaNd IN ComParatIve PersPeCtIve 89 (John McGarry 
ed., 2001); Donald L.  Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of  an Unlikely 
Constitutional Consensus, 21 BrIt. J. Pol. sCI. 213 (2002); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Power-Sharing: Three 
Big Problems, 25(2) J. demoCraCy 5 (2014).
2 mIChael emersoN & NatalIe toCCI, CyPrus as a lIghthouse of the east medIterraNeaN: shaPINg eu aCCessIoN 
aNd re-uNIfICatIoN (2002); Robert I. Rotberg, Cyprus after the Annan Plan: Next Steps Toward a Solution, 
Report for Program in Intrastate Conflict, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 
Kennedy School and World Peace Foundation, No. 37 (2003), available at http://belfercenter.hks.
harvard.edu/files/wpf37cyprusafterannanbcsia.pdf; Othon Anastasakis, Gilles Bertrand & Kaypso 
Nicolaïdis, Getting to Yes: Embellishment of  the Annan Plan for Cyprus, South East Asian Studies 
Programme, European Studies Centre (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.old.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/
knicolaidis/cyprus_report.pdf.
3 Lordos, Alexandros, Erol Kaymak, & Natalie Tocci, A People’s Peace in Cyprus (Testing Public Opinion on the 
Options for Comprehensive Settlement) (2009), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/32618/1/57._A_People’s_
Peace_in_Cyprus.pdf.
4 See doNald l. horoWItz, a demoCratIC south afrICa? CoNstItutIoNal eNgINeerINg IN a dIvIded soCIety (1991); 
doNald l. horoWItz, ethNIC grouPs IN CoNflICt (2d ed. 2000); Horowitz, Ethnic Power-Sharing, supra note 1, 
at 5.
5 For instance in the 1968 Beirut negotiations Glafkos Clerides, serving as the Greek Cypriot negotiator, 
proposed that the president and vice-president be elected together on a common ticket, a step that would 
have posed difficulties for hardliners on either side. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf  Denktash reacted by 
pointing to the threat of  communists coming to power, 1–4 glafkos ClerIdes, my dePosItIoN (1989–1991); 
ChrIstoforos fokaIdes, reCoNCIlINg NatIoN aNd state: glafkos ClerIdes aNd PolItICal traNsformatIoN IN CyPrus 
182 (2014).
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“proportional sequential” mechanism. Proportional sequential coalitions (“PS coali-
tions”), or so it is argued, are more likely to be agreeable to the Cypriot parties, and 
more likely to deliver functionality. PS grand coalitions also have significant advan-
tages over conventional consociational grand coalitions or consociational coalitions 
that are not grand.
The article is organized into two main sections. Section 2 summarizes the centrip-
etal critique of  grand coalitions. It then explains what a PS coalition is and its gen-
eral merits in relation to both centripetal and consociational alternatives in terms of  
adoptability, functionality, and normative attractiveness. Section 3 explains why a 
centripetal coalition is unlikely to be acceptable in Cyprus, and why a PS grand coali-
tion has more potential there.
2. Centripetal coalitions and proportional sequential 
coalitions
Centripetal theory is based on the core idea that institutional designers in deeply divided 
places should seek to foster a type of  politics that converges on the center—or mod-
erate—ground. It is argued in particular that electoral systems should be selected to 
advantage politicians by making it profitable for them to appeal across different ethnic 
communities.6 The centripetal electoral system most often recommended by Horowitz is 
the alternative vote, a majoritarian preferential electoral system which he believes facili-
tates inter-bloc transfers on lower preferences, and leads politicians to depend on the 
support of  other blocs for the margin of  victory. Cooperation among elected moderate 
politicians, it is thought, will produce moderate policies that can act as balm on ethnic 
divisions: a centripetalist “compromising middle” will be able to fend off  “extremists on 
the flanks.”7 Ideally, on the centripetalist view, it would be possible to create a moderate 
inter- or trans-ethnic party capable of  winning executive power by itself, either through 
a presidential system, as preferred by Horowitz, or through a parliamentary system. 
But if  this cannot be achieved, and it does seem unlikely in a deeply divided place, the 
next best option is a parliamentary coalition of  moderate ethnic parties.
For centripetalists, the choice between a moderate coalition and a consociational 
grand coalition is an easy one.8 Horowitz argues that consociational grand coali-
tions—because they include rival hardline parties—are unlikely to be agreed upon9 
6 See Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement, supra note 1; horoWItz, a demoCratIC south 
afrICa?, supra note 4; Donald L.  Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay; The Comparative Politics of  Ethnic 
Conflict Management, in CoNflICt aNd PeaCemakINg IN multIethNIC soCIetIes 451 (Joseph V.  Montville ed., 
1990); Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in desIgNINg demoCratIC INstItutIoNs 253, 
253–284 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000); Donald L. Horowitz, The Many Uses of  Federalism, 
55 drake l. rev. 953 (2007); Benjamin Reilly, Centripetalism, in routledge haNdBook of ethNIC CoNflICt 288 
(Stefan Wolff  & Karl Cordell eds., 2012).
7 See Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement, supra note 1, at 214.
8 See Horowitz, The Agreement, supra note 1, at 93; Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement, 
supra note 1, at 213.
9 “Consociational agreements are very hard to reach. This fact is not as notorious as it deserves to be.” See 
Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement, supra note 1, at 197.
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and unlikely to work. They are also seen as undemocratic, as they leave no room for 
opposition, in contrast with centripetal coalitions which need only be “minimum win-
ning” in size.10 Consociational grand coalitions are regarded as suited only to places 
where they are arguably not needed, such as the moderately plural, small western 
European democracies that gave rise to consociational theory (Belgium, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland). In deeply divided places, in contrast, consociations are 
seen as “inapt to moderate conflict.”11 The presence of  consociations in such places is 
seen to be as “rare as the Arctic rose,” and usually the result of  errors by international 
powers who impose them on unwilling locals.12
In the rest of  this section, we contrast centripetal coalitions and conventional consocia-
tional coalitions with an innovative type of  grand coalition based on proportional sequen-
tial mechanisms. We argue that such PS coalitions have advantages over the alternatives 
in terms of  adoptability and functionality, and without sacrificing democratic merit.13
A PS executive is established by applying a divisor to parties’ seat numbers in the 
legislature to allocate ministries proportionally and sequentially.14 The party with the 
highest number of  seats gets the first choice of  ministry; its seat total is then divided 
by the divisor, with the next ministry allocated to the party with the highest remain-
ing number of  seats. This process is repeated until all ministries are distributed. Ties 
in the number of  seats at any stage are broken by giving preference to the party with 
the highest number of  votes. The exact degree of  proportionality in the executive is a 
direct function of  the divisor used and the number of  ministries available.15 Holding 
the number of  ministries constant, the d’Hondt divisor (1, 2, 3, 4 . . .) is more favorable 
to larger parties than Sainte-Laguë (1, 3, 5,7 . . .), which is more favorable to larger 
parties than the Danish rule (1, 4, 7, 10 . . .). Table 1 shows how d’Hondt would allo-
cate ten ministries in a hypothetical 100 seat legislature with the following five-party 
configuration: a hardline party and a moderate party from Ethnic Group A, a hardline 
party and a moderate party from Ethnic Group B, and a small non-ethnic party. As 
the moderates from Group A are the largest party, they get the first ministry, their seat 
total is then divided by 2 (M+1, where M = ministry), which gives the second pick to 
the hardliners from Group B, and so on. The result is an executive which is not just 
10 Id. at 94.
11 Consociations are “more likely the product of  resolved struggles or of  relatively moderate cleavages than 
they are measures to resolve struggles and to moderate cleavages”. See horoWItz, ethNIC grouPs IN CoNflICt 
supra note 4, at 573; Horowitz, Constitutional Design, supra note 6, at 256.
12 See Horowitz, Constitutional Design, supra note 6, at 256 and 271; Horowitz, Explaining the Northern 
Ireland Agreement, supra note 1, at 197.
13 One of  us uses these same points to argue for the merits of  a proportional sequential coalition 
in Northern Ireland. John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Power-Sharing Executives: Consociational 
and Centripetal Formulae and the Case of  Northern Ireland, ethNoPolItICs 3–8 (2015), DOI: 
10.1080/17449057.2015.1088231.
14 For a recent analysis of  PS executives in Northern Ireland, see JoaNNe mCevoy, goverNINg IN BosNIa, 
maCedoNIa, aNd NortherN IrelaNd 39–107 (2014)
15 reIN taagePera & mattheW shugart, seats aNd votes: the effeCts aNd determINaNts of eleCtoral systems 
32–33 (1989).
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Power-sharing in a re-united Cyprus: Centripetal coalitions vs. proportional sequential coalitions 851
inclusive of  parties from Group A and Group B, but inclusive of  hardline and moderate 
parties from each of  these groups.
Divisor mechanisms have been used most commonly to allocate legislative seats to 
parties following PR elections by dividing the number of  votes and allocating accord-
ingly until the relevant number of  seats is filled in the relevant district. The d’Hondt 
version (previously independently invented by Jefferson) was initially used to allocate 
the number of  congressional seats to be held among the states of  the USA according 
to their respective population shares. It is also used to allocate Committee Chairs and 
Deputy Chairs in the European Parliament, and committee places in the Scottish par-
liament, by dividing the number of  seats. Since the Good Friday Agreement of  1998, 
however, d’Hondt has been employed to allocate ministries in the Northern Ireland 
executive. It has also been used in different formats to allocate executive and admin-
istrative offices in the Brussels-Capital Region in Belgium,16 and in the four largest 
Danish municipalities of  Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense, and Aalborg.17
Contrary to centripetalist arguments, grand coalitions may be agreed to in deeply 
divided polities, without external imposition. This is more likely under some condi-
tions than others, which is true of  the alternatives too. Perhaps the most important 
facilitative condition for any sort of  power-sharing coalition is a dual (or multiple) 
balance of  power that makes it difficult for one bloc to govern alone. If  this is absent, 
one community will seek to govern the other, either through one party or a coali-
tion of  parties, as happens in Israel and Sri Lanka, and happened in Northern Ireland 
between 1921 and 1972. Where an inter-bloc balance of  power exists, and each bloc 
is represented by one party or coalition of  parties, a grand coalition becomes a fea-
sible choice. Within the past twenty years, such an inter-bloc balance of  power has 
led to grand coalitions in Burundi (1999), Fiji (1997), Kenya (2008), and Zimbabwe 
Table 1. The D’Hondt divisor allocation mechanism (with 10 ministries in a 100 
seat legislature)
Party Hardliners 
Group A
Moderates 
Group A
Non-
Ethnic 
Party
Moderates 
Group B
Hardliners 
Group B
Divisor M+1 S M S M S M S M S M
1 22 (3rd)* 28 (1st) 5 22 (4th)* 23 (2nd)
2 11 (7th)* 14 (5th) 11 (8th)* 11.5 (6th)
3 7.3 9.3 (9th) 7.3 7.7 (10th)
Total M 2 3 0 2 3
Key: S = Seats in Legislature; M = Ministries in order of  portfolio choice.
* = the number of  total votes won by the party is used as a tie-breaker in cases where parties have identical 
numbers of  legislative seats.
16 See Thibaud Bodson & Neophytos Loizides, Consociationalism in the Brussels’ Capital Region: (Dis)
Proportional Representation and the Accommodation of  National Minorities, in PoWer-sharINg: emPIrICal aNd 
NormatIve CrItIques (Allison McCulloch & John McGarry eds., forthcoming 2016).
17 Brendan O’Leary, Bernard Grofman & Jørgen Elklit, Divisor methods for sequential portfolio allocation in 
multi-party executive bodies: Evidence from Northern Ireland and Denmark, 49(1) am. J. Pol. sCI. 198 (2005).
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(2009), albeit a sham coalition in the last case. Burundi has a large Hutu majority, 
but the Tutsi are a formerly dominant minority with strength in the military that can-
cels out the Hutu’s demographic advantage, so it is properly a case of  a dual balance 
of  power. As we shall see later, the same holds in Cyprus, where there is a dual bal-
ance of  power in spite of  the fact that the Turkish Cypriot community is only slightly 
larger as a proportion of  the population than Burundi’s Tutsi. Dual and multiple bal-
ances of  power between communities or parties have also facilitated grand coalitions 
in many other places, not all of  which were ethnically divided. They include Austria 
(1945–1966), Belgium (25% of  the 1918–1963 period),18 Colombia after its civil war 
(1958–1974), Germany (1966–1969, 2005–2009, and 2013 on), and Switzerland 
(since 1959). Some countries have opted for grand coalitions, even when they lacked 
an inter-bloc balance of  power, i.e., even when one bloc or party possessed a strong 
majority that was capable of  governing alone, for example Britain and Sweden formed 
“national governments” in the face of  external threats during wartime.
But what if  one or more of  the ethnic blocs in an ethnically divided place has more 
than one sizable party, as so often happens? In these contexts, a grand coalition is 
facilitated when there is an “intra”-bloc balance of  power alongside an inter-bloc bal-
ance. This is because it is difficult, when an intra-bloc balance exists, for one of  the 
bloc’s parties (Party A) to enter a coalition without the other (Party B). The difficulty 
arises primarily from the threat (or manifestation) of  outbidding from Party B, which 
will presumably be more hardline than Party A.19 Party A may also believe that Party 
B’s inclusion is necessary for stability and peace—for example, Party B can credibly 
threaten violence if  left out of  the coalition, or it may believe that Party B’s inclusion 
will strengthen the bloc’s overall clout within the power-sharing coalition in relation 
to other blocs. All of  these possibilities are enhanced the stronger Party B is within its 
bloc, i.e. the closer there is to a balance between the two parties. It was this confluence 
of  inter-bloc and intra-bloc balances that facilitated a two bloc, four party PS coali-
tion in Northern Ireland in 1998.20 As will be argued, the same inter- and intra-bloc 
balances exist in Cyprus, which makes a PS coalition feasible there too. In sum, grand 
coalitions, including PS coalitions, are facilitated when there is a balance of  power 
between or among blocs, and each bloc either has one party or an internal balance 
of  power between or among parties. As the discussed examples suggest, this phenom-
enon is not uncommon.
In contrast, agreement on centripetal coalitions is facilitated, in our view, when an 
inter-bloc balance of  power is matched with an “imbalance” within key blocs that 
favors moderate parties. If  an informal coalition of  moderate parties is to be estab-
lished, the moderate parties will have to be able to combine to form a majority in the 
legislature. This was what happened in Northern Ireland in 1973–74 when moderate 
parties established a power-sharing coalition—the “Sunningdale executive,” although 
18 This is based on Lijphart’s calculation. See areNd lIJPhart, demoCraCy IN Plural soCIetIes: a  ComParatIve 
exPloratIoN 32 (1977).
19 alvIN raBushka & keNNeth shePsle, PolItICs IN Plural soCIetIes: a theory of demoCratIC INstaBIlIty (1972); 
mIltoN J. esmaN, aN INtroduCtIoN to ethNIC CoNflICt 144–145 (2004).
20 McGarry & O’Leary, supra note 13.
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the coalition was critically weak within the unionist bloc—it was supported by only a 
minority of  unionist voters and deputies. If  a centripetal coalition or electoral system 
is to be formally required, perhaps as part of  a peace settlement, the moderate parties 
must be strong enough to put this on the negotiating table, and negotiate it to frui-
tion, including possibly passing it by referendum (perhaps, as is required in Cyprus, 
in each of  the relevant blocs). This is on the reasonably safe assumption that only 
moderate parties will back something that advantages them while hardline parties 
will oppose this as it is aimed at excluding them. Thus, we find that in Fiji in 1997, 
the only empirical example in the world where a centripetal electoral system has been 
agreed to and implemented with the purposive aim of  undergirding a parliamentary 
coalition of  moderates, the project was initiated and shepherded through the consti-
tutional review process by moderate parties from the Indian and Fijian communities, 
which at that point held leadership positions in each community.21 As we shall see, a 
centripetal electoral system was proposed and agreed to during negotiations in Cyprus 
in 2010, when, for the first time in post-independence Cypriot history, recognizably 
moderate leaders led both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.
Balance of  power considerations affect not just agreement on, but also the imple-
mentation and maintenance of  power-sharing coalitions, whether centripetal or 
grand. If  a centripetal coalition is agreed to (or imposed by outsiders), it will experi-
ence outbidding pressures in direct proportion to the strength of  excluded hardliners.22 
Although Northern Ireland’s moderate parties were able to agree to and implement a 
centripetal coalition in 1973–74, they were unable to maintain it: it imploded less 
than five months after it took office because the balance of  power in the unionist bloc 
favored hardliners and shifted increasingly in their direction during the coalition’s 
brief  period in office, forcing unionist moderates to withdraw from the coalition. Fiji’s 
implementation of  a centripetal electoral system in 1999 led to the electoral defeat of  
the moderate parties that had been responsible for its introduction.23 Although a cen-
tripetal electoral system was agreed to in Cyprus, it was not implemented, because one 
of  the two moderate parties to the agreement was defeated in elections. What these 
cases suggest is that while it is possible to get agreement on centripetal arrangements 
while moderates enjoy some form of  temporary leadership, itself  a rare phenomenon, 
the implementation and particularly the maintenance of  centripetal coalitions need 
moderate parties to enjoy a “stable” dominance in all relevant blocs, which may be 
even rarer than Arctic Roses. PS coalitions, in contrast, proportionally match intra- 
and inter community balances of  power, including, as we will discuss, shifting bal-
ances, which is useful for agreement, implementation and maintenance.
The need for preexisting moderate strength—among parties and voters—if  centri-
petalism is to be successful, is nowhere recognized by Horowitz. It is, however, accepted 
by one of  his leading supporters, Ben Reilly, who acknowledges that centripetal 
21 Jon Fraenkel & Bernard Grofman, Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies?: 
The Case of  Fiji, 39(5) ComP. Pol. stud. 623, 631, 636–637 (2006).
22 See raBushka & shePsle, supra note 19.
23 See Fraenkel & Grofman, supra note 21.
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institutions, designed to produce moderation, may require a pre-existing “core moder-
ate voice.”24 The problem is that this makes a centripetal coalition a circular propo-
sition in which moderation begets moderation, a conclusion that reduces its utility 
in deeply divided places—ironically, the very charge that centripetalists level against 
consociationalism.
While centripetalists believe that broad inclusion leads to dysfunctionality and 
instability, the thinking behind grand coalitions is that the inclusion of  hardline par-
ties can strengthen stability by giving such parties a stake in the system and by allow-
ing them to achieve at least some of  their aims constitutionally. The only conditions 
for inclusion should be each party’s ability to win sufficient votes to be entitled to at 
least one ministerial portfolio, and a commitment to non-violent politics.25 A PS coali-
tion offers particular functionality-enhancing institutional features that other grand 
coalitions do not. Individual hardline parties are given incentives to enter government 
because failure to do so results in their ministries going to rival parties rather than to a 
failure of  executive formation. This is an argument that hardline parties can usefully 
use to persuade reluctant supporters. With each party’s share of  ministries linked 
to its popular support, institutional incentives to parties to conduct themselves in a 
way that will broaden their electoral support are provided. As the most obvious way 
for radical parties to expand in the context of  inclusive political institutions is at the 
expense of  co-ethnic moderate parties, there is an incentive to moderate, as long as 
this can be achieved without an offsetting loss of  votes to new parties on the hard-
liners’ extreme flank.26 A variety of  institutional mechanisms are available to reduce 
this latter threat.27 Such a moderation of  radical parties occurred in Northern Ireland 
after its adoption of  a PS coalition based on d’Hondt. Sinn Fein and the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), once at polar opposite ends of  Northern Ireland’s political spec-
trum, have been cooperating partners in government for over seven years.28
Another functional advantage of  PS coalitions is that once parties agree to share 
power across ethnic communities, and providing the settlement specifies the number 
of  ministries, executive formation occurs automatically following elections. There is 
no need for further negotiations or bargaining, or for ratification by the legislature. 
24 BeNJamIN reIlly, demoCraCy IN dIvIded soCIetIes: eleCtoral eNgINeerINg for CoNflICt maNagemeNt 178, 181 
(2001).
25 It requires no other political convergence, not even a commitment to the state in question.
26 Paul Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans & Brendan O’Leary, Extremist Outbidding in Ethnic Party Systems is Not 
Inevitable: Tribune Parties in Northern Ireland, 57(2) Pol. stud. loNdoN 357 (2009).
27 Any institutional rule that helps large parties will have this effect, such as the d’Hondt divisor; a reduc-
tion in the number of  ministries; electoral thresholds to win seats in the legislature; or small electoral dis-
trict magnitudes. Such measures have to be balanced against the need for retaining a reasonably fair level 
of  proportionality. One mechanism that allows party leaders to maintain discipline and reduce the risk 
of  splits, without affecting proportionality, is list-proportional representation. See taagePera & shugart, 
supra note 15, at 24.
28 See John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Power-Shared after Death of  Thousands, in CoNsoCIatIoNal theory: 
mCgarry-o’leary aNd the NortherN IrelaNd CoNflICt 15 (Rupert Taylor ed., 2009). Power-sharing in 
Northern Ireland has come under strain in 2015, but even if  the executive failed tomorrow, it has per-
formed much better than its critics imagined. See Christopher McCrudden et al., Why Northern Ireland’s 
Institutions Need Stability, gov’t & oPPosItIoN (Aug. 11, 2014).
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Centripetal rules, by contrast, can give rise to serious executive formation problems. 
If  these rules are formal, i.e., the executive requires cross-ethnic support in direct or 
indirect elections, this may simply not be forthcoming. The UN Plan for Cyprus (the 
Annan Plan) that was put to a referendum in 2004 had a moderates-privileging cen-
tripetal rule that called for an executive council to be indirectly elected by a majority of  
the Senate plus two-fifths of  each of  the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Senators, 
but bizarrely did not provide for a (necessarily non-centripetal) default rule that would 
come into play if  the threshold was not met.29 Had the referendum passed, the re-
united Cyprus might have started without a government, and with no constitutional 
way to form one. The Annan Plan also stated that any vacancy in the council would be 
replaced using the same election rule, but again didn’t stipulate what would happen if  
no one met the threshold.30
Informal centripetal electoral systems have equally serious executive formation 
problems. These are based on the alternative vote, or on related preferential voting 
systems, which are said to incentivize politicians to appeal across ethnic lines, and 
voters to vote across them, but do not guarantee either sort of  behavior. This infor-
mal option ensures a result, but not a centripetal one. The adoption of  the centripetal 
“supplementary vote” for presidential elections in Sri Lanka in 1978 was supposed 
to encourage moderate Sinhalese candidates to reach out for Tamil votes but this did 
not happen until 2015.31 The Sinhalese candidates seem to have concluded that such 
cross-bloc appeals risked losing more votes from their own larger community than 
would be gained from the other smaller community. In Republika Srpska’s presidential 
election in 2000, which was based on the alternative vote, the Bosniak minority pre-
ferred to waste its votes by transferring to unelectable Bosniak candidates rather than 
to the moderate Serb candidate.32
The automaticity of  PS coalitions can also be contrasted positively with consocia-
tional or other types of  coalitions that rely on post-election bargaining to decide which 
parties will be in government, and how many ministries, and which portfolios, each 
party will have. Even in stable democracies, and even when there is ideological coher-
ence among potential coalition partners, agreement on these issues can represent a 
“formidable task.”33 In divided or deeply divided places, the task is likely to be even 
29 Annan Plan, art. XXV, § 2(e) (2004).
30 Id. art. XXVI, § 5.
31 Sunil Bastian, The Political Economy of  Electoral Reform in Sri Lanka, in CaN demoCraCy Be desIgNed? the 
PolItICs of INstItutIoNal ChoICe IN War-torN soCIetIes 196 (Sunil Bastian & Robin Luckham eds., 2003); 
Allison McCulloch, The Track Record of  Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places, in PoWer-sharINg IN deePly 
dIvIded PlaCes 94 (Joanne McEvoy & Brendan O’Leary eds., 2013).
32 The harder line of  the two Serb candidates was elected on the second count, after receiving 49.8% of  the 
vote in the first count. After the first count, a small Bosniak party—BOSS—was eliminated. A third of  its 
12,951 supporters chose not to transfer beyond their first preference. Of  a total of  8927 transfers, only 
3% crossed ethnic lines, and only two per cent of  this total went to the moderate Serb. Enough votes, a 
fraction of  1%, were transferred to the Serb hardliner, ironically, to ensure his election. sumaNtra Bose, 
BosNIa after daytoN: NatIoNalIst PartItIoN aNd INterNatIoNal INterveNtIoN 233 (2000).
33 Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan, Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries in a 
Parliamentary System, 16 J. theoretICal Pol. 143 (2004).
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more difficult. Following the 2007 election in Belgium, it took 176  days to form a 
caretaker coalition that brought together enough parties to govern and that also con-
formed to constitutional provisions on cabinet parity for Francophones and Dutch-
speakers.34 The problem was repeated in 2010–2011, when it took 541 days to form 
a cabinet, breaking the world record for the longest period of  time without a govern-
ment. After deadly riots following a disputed election in late 2007, Kenya’s parties 
agreed to share power, and on a rule to allocate ministries proportionally, but not on 
how to allocate particular portfolios. Within three months, disagreements over this 
threatened the power-sharing agreement.35
In Zimbabwe in 2009, three parties agreed to share power, but portfolio allocation 
was left to Robert Mugabe who subsequently allocated most of  the important portfo-
lios, particularly those touching on security, to his own party, making a sham of  the 
original power-sharing deal. Even when Mugabe reverted to single party rule after win-
ning presidential elections in July 2013, it took him six weeks to form an executive 
because of  “a need to balance factions within Zanu-PF.”36 In Iraq after the 2010 elec-
tions it took eleven months, including an advisory opinion from a transitional supreme 
court with an expired mandate, before a coalition government was formed, and even 
then certain posts remained unfilled. The prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, imitated 
Mugabe’s move in 2009, this time retaining the two most important security ministries 
in his own office. The lack of  confidence that this gave rise to among Iraq’s Sunni Arab 
minority helped to unleash a civil war in which Baghdad lost control of  large parts of  
the country and which led to al-Maliki’s ouster in 2014. Finally, in Afghanistan former 
rivals, President Ashraf  Ghani and his chief  executive, Abdullah Abdullah, agreed to 
form a government of  national unity in September 2014 after a disputed presidential 
election but only announced the list of  ministers three months later causing a sharp 
drop in approval ratings.37 Centripetal coalitions of  moderate parties also face these 
problems of  bargaining over portfolio allocation on top of  those already identified.
By way of  contrast, a useful functional and normative feature of  a PS coalition is 
that it is based on “proportionality.” Each party gets a share of  ministries, including 
im portant ministries, proportionate to its share of  legislative seats and popular support. 
The process brings an element of  fairness and choice, which is seen by coalition special-
ists as strongly linked to system adoption and system maintenance.38 Proportionality 
permits a “liberal” form of  consociation in which executive positions are allocated 
to any party that meets the electoral threshold, regardless of  their basis.39 Liberal 
34 Kris Deschouwer & Philippe Van Parijs, Electoral Engineering for a Stalled Federation, in PoWer-sharINg IN 
deePly dIvIded PlaCes, supra note 31, at 211.
35 Jeremy Horowitz, Power-Sharing in Kenya, Paper Presented at Workshop on Political Inclusion in Africa, 
American University, Apr. 24–25, 2009.
36 Sliding Backwards Again, eCoNomIst, Feb. 15, 2014. One might argue that a PS coalition could suffer simi-
lar difficulties if  factional fights within a party that qualified for ministries meant that it (or its leader) was 
unable to agree on who should take them. In this case, however, there would be a very strong incentive 
for the party to decide, as it would otherwise lose its ministries.
37 Politics in Afghanistan: Cabinet Joiners, eCoNomIst, Feb. 17, 2015.
38 See Brams & Kaplan, supra note 33.
39 John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of  2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription, 
5(4) INt’l J. CoNst. l. 1 (2007).
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consociations are generally normatively preferable to “corporate” consociations, such 
as those in Bosnia or Lebanon, where executive positions are restricted to representa-
tives of  predetermined ethnic communities, and which are said to discriminate against 
individuals and communities outside the protected categories.40 Liberal consociations 
are able to cope better than corporate consociations with demographic and political 
change. For example, a liberal consociation would have helped address the problems 
that gave rise to civil war in Lebanon between 1975 and 1989, when the Shia Muslim 
population demanded a share of  power that better matched its increasing share of  the 
population. Liberal consociations may also facilitate the transcendence of  ethnic divi-
sions better than corporate consociations, because they permit non-ethnic parties to 
share in power, in line with their popular support. Indeed, as non-ethnic parties are 
likely to be rather small in deeply divided places, the combination of  liberal consocia-
tion and inclusion offered by a PS executive is likely to be the only way such parties 
have a chance of  attaining executive office. Liberal consociations are also much less 
likely than corporate consociations to be challenged by courts, particularly in Europe, 
that are increasingly likely to find the latter discriminatory on the basis of  ethnicity.41
The consociational principle of  proportionality is usually both fair and stabilizing 
because it is a reasonable proxy for the political balance of  power. However, sometimes 
the balance of  power does not reflect shares of  the electorate, and in these cases a 
strong minority (or majority)—one that has external backing or military power—may 
insist on a disproportionate share of  ministries. When deviations from strict propor-
tionality occur, this requires the group beneficiaries of  power-sharing to be specified, 
i.e., it requires a move away from liberal consociational principles. The best that can 
be done in these circumstances is to see that any deviation from proportionality and 
liberal consociation is as small as possible. As we shall see, the rules for a PS exec-
utive can be altered so that a strong minority receives slight over-representation in 
the executive while retaining the principles of  liberal consociation for the bulk of  the 
executive. If  it becomes necessary to move from liberal consociation to a system that 
specifies corporate quotas, this can be done in as inclusive a way as possible, for exam-
ple by nationality rather than religion, or by language ability rather than by mother 
tongue. As we show below with respect to Cyprus, where Turkish Cypriots are a strong 
minority, there are different ways to conceive of  a PS executive that adheres to inclu-
sivity, automaticity, and a reasonable, as opposed to a strict, form of  proportionality.
Finally, contrary to centripetalists’ claims, inclusive coalitions based on propor-
tional and sequential mechanisms can have reasonably robust democratic creden-
tials. They establish governments that are democratically and proportionally inclusive 
of  all parties with significant mandates that are willing to take their entitlements to 
portfolios. This democratic inclusiveness contrasts favorably with both centripetal 
minimum-winning coalitions and single party government in plurality systems, each 
of  which may enjoy power with the support of  a bare majority or even a plurality of  
voters. Proportional inclusion also prevents the disproportional distortions that occur 
40 Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eur. Ct. H.R., Grand Chamber Judgment, Dec. 22, 2009.
41 ChrIstoPher mCCruddeN & BreNdaN o’leary, Courts aNd CoNsoCIatIoN: humaN rIghts versus PoWer-sharINg 
(2013).
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in minimum winning coalitions, such as those in Israel or Germany, where small 
parties frequently enjoy disproportionate pivotality because they hold the balance 
between large political factions.
PS executives are inconsistent with “governments in waiting” if  by this is meant 
the conventional practice where a party or a minimum winning coalition of  parties 
assumes office while the remaining parties go into opposition to wait their turn. This 
does not mean, however, that governments cannot be changed. Voters remain free 
to punish or reward any party by increasing or decreasing its share of  ministries (or 
by altering its place in the sequence of  portfolio allocation), and to vote new parties 
into the coalition while expelling any of  its current parties, although the latter will be 
unlikely in practice in the case of  large parties. In any case, accumulated (and inclu-
sive) experience in government is not clearly a negative factor in places that have seri-
ous ethnic divisions, or serious financial problems for that matter, with the lack of  
experience in coalitions exacerbating Greece’s problems during the post-2008 finan-
cial crisis.42
Moreover, the lack of  a conventional government and opposition model applies only 
to cases of  permanent (i.e., temporally open-ended) PS executives, but these are not 
the only possibility. PS coalitions, or grand coalitions in general, can be agreed to for 
limited time periods, to get through emergencies or transitions. This was what hap-
pened in South Africa, when a grand coalition was included as a temporary measure, 
lasting from 1994 to 1999, to reassure the white minority in the context of  the end 
of  apartheid. It is what happened in homogeneous countries like Sweden and the UK, 
where grand coalitions were adopted during wartime. The grand coalition agreed to 
in Kenya in February 2008 was also time-limited, to one parliamentary term, and the 
same is true of  Germany’s current post-2013 grand coalition.
The accountability of  the executive to voters may be less clear under a PS coali-
tion than when a single party is in government, but it is not noticeably less clear than 
under any multi-party coalition, which is the more frequent alternative. Lacking a 
government in waiting does not mean the absence of  opposition, two matters that are 
usually conflated. Not every party qualifies for government under a PS mechanism, 
just all parties that meet its threshold. Parties that qualify are free to go into opposi-
tion should they choose: a PS executive does not mean that parties must accept their 
ministerial entitlements, only that they are entitled to them.
If  legislative committee chairs and deputy chairs are also allocated by a PS mech-
anism, as happens in Northern Ireland, a party that opts out of  government remains 
entitled to lead a committee that questions the government. It can also be estab-
lished as a detail of  a settlement, as has again happened in Northern Ireland, that 
parties holding particular ministries are matched during committee hearings and 
42 Greece entered the global financial crisis in a very vulnerable position despite having single-party govern-
ments for almost the entire post-1974 period. See Iosif  Kovras & Neophytos Loizides, The Sovereign Debt 
Crisis in Southern Europe: Majoritarian Pitfalls?, 47 (1) ComP. Pol. 1 (2015). In their recent electoral his-
tory both Greece and Turkey have adopted majoritarian political systems disproportionally favouring the 
largest party in parliament. Hence, political elites in Cyprus have lacked positive examples of  consensus 
democratic practices either from the “two motherlands” or the broader region.
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legislative debates with committee chairs and deputy-chairs from a different party. 
There is no provision for opposition parties to perform this role in the winner-takes-
all Westminster system, often seen as the paradigmatic example of  parliamentary 
accountability, but where all committees except public account committees are nor-
mally chaired by government MPs.
Indeed, governments in such parliamentary systems are usually careful to ensure 
that they maintain control over virtually all committees. As committee chairs and 
deputy chairs in a PS executive would be more likely to have more informal access, 
through party sources, to executive discussions than conventional oppositions pos-
sess, robust questioning can be facilitated and the screening of  executive decisions 
from legislative scrutiny made more difficult. Given that the parties in an inclusive 
coalition are likely to be “opposed” to each other, it is reasonable to expect that this will 
also deliver accountability. Indeed, centripetalists’ complaint that inclusive coalitions 
lack opposition is in some tension with their other contention that inclusive coalitions 
are likely to be mired in internal opposition.
3. The case for a proportional sequential coalition in Cyprus
An important part of  the case for a PS coalition in Cyprus is that conditions there are 
of  the sort that facilitate the agreement and maintenance of  PS coalitions. In contrast, 
the conditions that facilitate centripetal coalitions are absent. Moderate parties in 
either community in Cyprus are too weak to adopt and to sustain a centripetal coali-
tion. This is clear from the fate of  a proposal for a centripetal coalition in 2008–2010, 
as discussed next. 43
In negotiations that began in September 2008, the Greek Cypriot leader and 
President of  Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, proposed a two-person collegial presidency 
for a united Cyprus in which a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot would rotate in 
office, with the latter serving for one third of  each term. The presidency was to be 
elected by a centripetal electoral system known as “weighted cross-voting.” This 
envisaged an electorate for the Greek Cypriot member of  the presidency that would 
be 80 percent Greek Cypriot and 20 percent Turkish Cypriot, and an electorate for 
the Turkish Cypriot member that would be 80 percent Turkish Cypriot and 20 per-
cent Greek Cypriot.44 The proposal was intended to replace traditional arrangements 
whereby the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders were elected by separate elec-
toral rolls, and was designed to achieve the core centripetal goal of  benefiting moder-
ates, as the minorities in each electorate could reasonably be expected to vote for a 
moderate from the other community. In effect, weighted cross-voting proposed a 20 
percent start for Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot moderates in run-offs against rela-
tively hardline rivals, in a context where leadership elections were normally decided 
43 For a recent account that explores solutions to the Cyprus problem, see resolvINg CyPrus: NeW aPProaChes 
to CoNflICt resolutIoN (James Ker-Lindsay ed., 2014)
44 The details of  the weighted cross-voting proposals were reported by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet 
Ali Talat, on his Facebook account in March 2012.
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by much smaller margins.45 Christofias’s weighted cross-voting proposal was accepted 
by Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader and President of  the unrecognized 
Turkish Republic of  Northern Cyprus (TRNC), in January of  2010, although the 
proposal’s implementation awaited the successful negotiation of  a comprehensive 
settlement of  the Cyprus problem and its ratification in simultaneous referendums by 
majorities in each community.
Weighted cross-voting was accepted in a context where the intra-bloc balance of  
power in both communities was unusually propitious. Talat led the left-wing and pro-
settlement CTP. He was the most moderate Turkish Cypriot leader since Cyprus gained 
independence in 1960. His interlocutor, Christofias, led the left-wing and pro-settlement 
AKEL, and was one of  the most moderate Greek Cypriot leaders since 1960. It was the 
first time since independence that two moderates led both communities simultaneously. 
Support for centripetalism came naturally to both leaders, as Talat’s CTP was the Turkish 
Cypriot political party most likely to win votes from Greek Cypriots while Christofias’s 
AKEL was the Greek Cypriot party most likely to win votes from Turkish Cypriots.
In reality, however, neither of  the two moderate leaders enjoyed a clear or stable 
dominance within their respective blocs. This was particularly important in Talat’s 
case as he was up for re-election in April 2010. Although Talat had been elected in 
2005 with 55 percent of  the vote in the first round, economic decline and disillusion-
ment with negotiations had led to his CTP receiving just 29 percent of  the vote in the 
Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections of  2009. By contrast, a right-wing nation-
alist party, the UBP, won the 2009 elections with 44 percent of  the vote. Its leader, 
Derviş Eroğlu, became prime minister of  the TRNC. The Democratic Party, another 
hardline nationalist party, won 11 percent of  the vote. Effectively, although Talat was 
President, his political party—the CTP—was in a weak minority position within the 
Turkish Cypriot bloc at the time he agreed to weighted cross-voting.
Understandably, both hardline Turkish Cypriot parties were fiercely opposed to 
weighted cross-voting, as it was purposely designed to marginalize them. Eroğlu 
immediately denounced the proposed electoral system on the grounds that the right 
would cease to exist.46 In the presidential election campaign of  April 2010, Eroğlu 
45 When weighted cross-voting, or variations of  it, have been proposed in Cyprus, it has been argued that 
it would ensure that the elected candidates from each community would have to “seriously take into 
account both communities’ interests and concerns”: Greek Cypriot Proposals, Cyprus National Council, 
Jan. 30, 1989, available at http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/0/1CF2A298CB8C65CEC2256D6
D00344433/$file/Proposals%201989.pdf. It was also argued that
 it would make it advisable for politicians of  both communities to appeal also to members of  the 
other community for their votes. Until now there has been no advantage in so doing. [Weighted 
cross-voting would] give a premium to all politicians to develop policies that would appeal to 
members of  the other community. Not all would. Those that did would be rewarded by receiving 
voters from the other community which at the margins would affect the outcome of  elections.
 See A Guide on Cross-Voting: A Necessary Feature for a Viable Cyprus Settlement, 38 frIeNds of CyPrus (Autumn 
1995), available at http://www.peace-cyprus.org/FOC/Inter-Situation/38.htm.
46 Kıbrıslı Rumların “çapraz oy” önerisine, Ankara’dan “serbest dolaşım” şartı [In response to the Greek 
Cypriot proposal for cross-voting, Ankara is asking for the freedom of  movement], euraCtIv, Dec. 28, 
2009, available at http://www.euractiv.com.tr/8/article/kibrisli-rumlarin-capraz-oy-onerisine-
ankaradan-4-ozgrlk-art-008290.
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formed an electoral pact with the Democratic Party’s leader, Serdar Denktaş, on the 
issue of  weighted cross-voting, and won in the first round. Eroğlu became his commu-
nity’s interlocutor in the negotiations, and that terminated the centripetal electoral 
proposal.
In the Greek Cypriot bloc, Christofias’s AKEL was in a similar position to Talat’s 
CTP, although Christofias did not face re-election. There was (and is) a reasonably 
stable three way balance of  power within the Greek Cypriot bloc among the left 
(AKEL), centre-right (DISY), and nationalist right (DIKO and an assortment of  smaller 
parties). Christofias depended for his election as president in 2008 on the support 
of  DIKO in the second round of  a two round contest. In the first round, Christofias 
won 33 percent of  the vote, compared to 32 percent for the hardline DIKO candi-
date, Papadopoulos, and 33 percent for the centre-right DISY’s Kassoulides. With 
Papadopoulos eliminated, DIKO switched its support to Christofias, which allowed 
him to defeat Kassoulides in the second round by 53 percent to 47 percent. Similarly, 
between 2006 and 2011, AKEL held only eighteen of  fifty-six seats (with 31 per-
cent of  the vote) in the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of  Cyprus’s legislature, and 
depended on a coalition with hardline DIKO (eleven seats and 18 percent of  the vote) 
for a governing majority.
Christofias’s intra-bloc weakness, and his dependence on a nationalist coalition 
partner, helped to prevent him from making concessions to Talat that might have 
secured Talat’s re-election, or from securing a settlement, including weighted cross-
voting, before the Turkish Cypriot leader had to face re-election. Christofias, who 
started his own presidency with high levels of  public approval,47 eventually wasted 
his political capital by failing to promote his own compromise for a cross-voted and 
rotating presidency. During the critical 2010 Turkish Cypriot presidential election 
campaign Christofias opposed a joint declaration with Talat, failing “to take advan-
tage of  the golden opportunity to announce progress in the negotiations.”48 After 
Talat’s defeat, Christofias decided not to run for re-election when his term ended in 
2013, his decision reinforced by a serious economic crisis. He was replaced by DISY’s 
Nicos Anastasiades, who was also put into power with DIKO’s help, and who opposed 
weighted cross voting because it favored the left.49
47 Support was evident initially across the political spectrum including from DISY, the largest opposition 
party, but during the negotiations, Christofias’s approval for the handling of  the Cyprus problem dropped 
to 45%, down from 75% in 2008. See Clock Ticking On Reunification Talks, BusINess moNItor oNlINe, Oct. 13, 
2009.
48 Christofia horis na plithis na min milas gia ton Talat [Christofias: before washing yourself  don’t talk about 
Talat], sIgmalIve, July 19, 2012, available at http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/508293.
49 Even DISY, the only Greek Cypriot political party apart from AKEL that has any serious prospect of  
winning support from Turkish Cypriots, denounced weighted cross voting. The party’s vice-chair 
argued it had been concocted to “keep the left governing Cyprus forever.” See Resigning is Christofias’s 
Only Option, PhIleleftheros, Sept. 4, 2011. Even the pro-settlement Cyprus Mail accused Christofias 
in its humour column of  wasting “most of  his meetings with Talat negotiating some lunatic formula 
(emphasis added) that would allow him to be elected president of  the federal state.” See Pres Nik Living 
the Dream in Germany, CyPrus maIl, May 11, 2014, available at http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/05/11/
tales-from-the-coffeeshop-pres-nik-living-the-dream-in-germany/.
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The lack of  stable dominance by moderate parties in either of  Cyprus’s two 
blocs meant that a centripetal proposal more modest than those recommended by 
Horowitz,50 and conceived under the “most likely to succeed” political conditions in 
Cyprus’s post-independence history, could not be adopted. The moderates were able to 
agree on a centripetal proposal in negotiations but lacked the necessary dominance to 
steer it through the adoption process in the face of  outbidding by hardliners.
Cyprus’s intra-communal balance of  power, in which neither moderates nor hard-
liners are stably dominant, but in which there is a rough balance, points towards the 
need for a PS coalition rather than a centripetal coalition. The first step involves select-
ing an appropriate PS divisor, because while each delivers proportionality, some are 
more favorable to small parties, and therefore to small communities. If  the d’Hondt 
divisor (1, 2, 3 …) that was used in Northern Ireland was used to allocate eight min-
istries in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot parties, which received 23 percent of  the combined 
votes cast in the last Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections, 
would get only one ministry, or 12.5 percent of  the total (the CTP would receive sixth 
pick). This result would neither accommodate the inter-community balance between 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, nor the intra-community balance between mod-
erates and hardliners in the Turkish Cypriot bloc. If, by contrast, the Danish divisor 
(1, 4, 7 …) was used, Turkish Cypriot parties would receive a more fairly proportional 
two of  eight ministries, or 25 percent. They would also get higher, and fairer picks: 
CTP would receive fourth pick and UBP 8th pick (see Table 2).51
One complication is that the Turkish Cypriots are likely to insist on more than 25 
percent of  ministries, and will probably want around 33 percent. This latter figure 
would better reflect the inter-community balance of  power in which Turkish Cypriots, 
backed by Turkey, are in a much stronger bargaining position than their demo-
graphic weight would suggest. The same balance led, in the 1960 constitution, to 
Turkish Cypriots receiving 33 percent of  cabinet positions, and 40 percent of  army 
and police positions—and the 1960 precedent, reflected in subsequent settlement ini-
tiatives including the UN’s Annan Plan in 2004, makes it all the more difficult for 
Turkish Cypriots to accept strict demographic proportionality. Fortunately, there is 
no serious political obstacle to modest Turkish Cypriot over-representation, as Greek 
Cypriot leaders, increasingly realistic about inter-bloc power balances (realpolitik) 
after decades of  negotiations, have conceded the principle on many occasions,52 but 
50 Horowitz’s preferred centripetal electoral systems are the majoritarian alternative vote and the distributions 
method (where a winning presidential candidate requires a plurality or majority plus a certain low thresh-
old–such as 20–25%–in different regions of  the country). Neither of  these electoral systems are thinkable 
in Cyprus, as they both raise the possibility that a Turkish Cypriot candidate, or a Greek Cypriot-Turkish 
Cypriot joint ticket, could be elected without a single Turkish Cypriot vote. For details, see John McGarry, 
Centripetalism, Consociationalism and Cyprus: A Close-up Analysis of  the “Adoption” Issue, in PoWer-sharINg: 
emPIrICal aNd NormatIve CrItIques (Allison McCulloch & John McGarry eds., forthcoming 2016) Christofias 
knew that such proposals would be unacceptable, which is why he proposed an electoral arrangement that 
allowed each community to play an “equal” role in the election of  the other community’s candidate.
51 The Danish rule was suggested to the authors by Brendan O’Leary.
52 Anything more than a modest over-representation of  Turkish Cypriots would pose a risk of  rejection by 
Greek Cypriot voters in a referendum.
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it poses a technical problem if  all ministries are allocated by a PS mechanism, which 
emphasizes proportionality. The simplest, and fairest, way to deal with this complica-
tion is to have two co-first ministers (or prime ministers)—likely to be necessary in any 
case—and to allocate these outside the PS mechanism on the basis of  parity, with one 
position going to the leader of  the largest party in each community. Parity is a norma-
tively defensible principle when one community is asked to throw in its fortunes with 
another, although it can hardly be insisted on in all offices if  the communities differ 
significantly in size. In the specific context of  Cyprus, the need for parity is recognized 
by the agreed principle of  “political equality” between the two communities, which 
is generally seen as compatible with numerical equality in a few areas (such as rep-
resentation in the courts, and Senate). Appointing two first ministers on the basis of  
parity, and allocating another eight ministers on the basis of  the Danish rule would 
give Turkish Cypriot political parties a safe three of  ten ministries,53 or 30 percent (see 
Model 1 in Table 2). Indeed, this would resemble what happens in Northern Ireland. 
Both before and since 2007, its First Minister and Deputy First Minister have been 
appointed apart from the rest of  the executive on the basis of  what is, in effect, a parity 
principle, although, in Northern Ireland, because the communities are close in size, 
parity and proportionality converge. In Northern Ireland, the co-first ministers are 
also allowed to co-appoint junior ministers, and have agreed to one each. If  this was 
permitted in Cyprus, expected Turkish Cypriot representation would increase to 33 
percent of  total ministers, or four of  twelve.
Alternatively, if  a decision was made to draw electoral boundaries for the federal 
legislature in such a way that Turkish Cypriot parties could reasonably expect to win 
roughly 30 to 33 percent of  the seats, then the Danish divisor could be used to allocate 
all of  the federal ministries, including the co-first ministers. The over-representation 
of  small units in federal legislatures, including in lower houses, is a common practice, 
and such over-representation for the “territory” of  the Turkish Cypriot constituent 
state could be justified on federal grounds. The Annan Plan of  2004 slightly overrep-
resented the Turkish Cypriot constituent state by giving it no less than 25 percent of  
the seats in the federal lower house. These ancillary rules would allow either most or 
all of  the executive to be elected in a difference blind (liberal consociational) manner, 
and they show how PS mechanisms can be flexibly adjusted to satisfy particular bal-
ances of  power.54
A second way to over-represent Turkish Cypriots is less desirable from a liberal 
consociational perspective, but is likely to be more attractive to Turkish Cypriots (and 
thus more consistent with the ‘real’ inter-community balance), as it would offer them 
firm corporate quotas, now and in the future. It is also more in keeping with Cypriot 
53 This means safe in all foreseeable scenarios, including those where Greek Cypriot parties join together to 
take advantage of  the allocation system, although this could also be made difficult through well-designed 
party laws that prohibited such opportunistic behaviour.
54 An alternative to the Danish divisor is the Hare quota (total votes/total seats), which is already used in the 
Republic of  Cyprus to allocate seats in municipal, national and European parliament elections. Both the 
Danish rule and the Hare quota could guarantee automaticity and proportionality, and they both favour 
smaller parties.
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practice, including the 1960 constitution and Annan Plan, both of  which were based 
on corporate principles. In this alternative, the two communities would be constitu-
tionally guaranteed a proportion of  ministries, with around one-third allocated to 
Turkish Cypriots.
In this case, the PS mechanism would be run twice, once among each community’s 
elected political parties (see Model 2 in Table 3). The Turkish Cypriots would prefer 
that any such parliamentary executive be based on the federal Senate, elections to 
which are likely to be contested on separate electoral rolls, with the senators serving 
as communal representatives. As long as there was prior agreement in the constitu-
tional settlement on the number of  ministries and the sequence in which each bloc’s 
parties would take their ministerial picks, this mechanism would deliver full automa-
ticity and inclusivity. It would also offer proportionality within each of  the blocs but 
not between them. The preferred divisor in this case would likely be d’Hondt, on the 
grounds that, given corporate guarantees, there would no longer be a need to protect 
the small Turkish Cypriot community (as in Model 1 in Table 2), and that favoring 
large parties in power-sharing deals discourages outbidding. In Model 2 (Table 3), we 
have assumed that the co-first ministerships will be assigned to the leading parties in 
each bloc, although in Model 2, this will constitute the first picks of  these two parties.
Model 2 (Table 3), with its reliance on corporate quotas, is more likely to be criti-
cized by the European courts, which have interfered increasingly in power-sharing 
settlements, although the courts may also decide that such quotas meet their key test 
of  “reasonableness.”55 The dangers of  judicial intervention could be reduced, but not 
removed, if  the barriers for membership in the two communities were low, for example 
if  the communities were defined in terms of  language, as happens in Belgium, instead 
of  mother tongue or ethnicity. The Brussels Capital Region runs the d’Hondt pro-
cess internally within each linguistic community while in a number of  decisions the 
Belgian Constitutional Court has ruled that pre-determining the number of  seats allo-
cated to each language group does not violate the European Convention on Human 
Rights principles of  equality and non-discrimination.56 Nonetheless, the corporate 
quotas option also raises the potential for future political difficulties if  the communi-
ties change in size as happened in Lebanon, or if  new identity groups emerge as hap-
pened in post-National Front Colombia.
A PS executive constructed in either of  these ways (Tables 2 or 3) would be likely to 
win broader political support among both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot political 
parties than the centripetal presidency proposals considered between 2008 and 2010, 
or any other executive arrangement that gives moderates a decisive advantage. This 
is because both PS models broadly respect the inter- and intra-community power bal-
ances. As the 2008–2010 proposal would have decisively advantaged the moderate 
wings of  each bloc (AKEL and CTP), and likely restricted the executive to them, we can 
reasonably surmise that the other parties in each bloc entitled to office under Models 
1 and 2 would prefer a PS executive. On the Greek Cypriot side, these other parties 
55 See mCCruddeN & o’leary, supra note 41.
56 See Bodson & Loizides, supra note 16.
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(DISY, DIKO, and EDEK) won 59 percent of  the vote in the last parliamentary elec-
tion, compared to AKEL’s 33 percent. In the Turkish Cypriot bloc, the two parties most 
likely to be excluded under centripetalism (the UBP and DP)—which would both be in 
the governing coalition under Model 2 (Table 3) or if  the number of  ministries were 
increased in Model 1 (Table 2)—won 50 percent, compared to the CTP’s 37 percent.
Moreover, AKEL and the CTP, the major moderate parties in each bloc, are unlikely 
to be as antagonistic towards a PS executive as the hardline parties are towards cen-
tripetalism. This is because as moderate parties, AKEL and the CTP are more flexible 
on executive arrangements, and may well, like their Northern Ireland counterparts in 
1998, come to see the benefits of  inclusion for stability, and to avoid outbidding.57 It 
is also because a PS executive would include the moderate parties too, while a centri-
petal executive would exclude the hardliners. Indeed, under both models, AKEL and 
the CTP would have nearly half  the seats in the PS executive, and in some scenarios 
could form a majority.
Even if  more political parties in Cyprus are likely to prefer a PS executive over a cen-
tripetal executive, they will support the former only if  they can be reasonably assured 
it will be functional. This is particularly important in Cyprus, as it is the site of  one 
of  the most infamous consociational failures in modern history: the collapse of  the 
1960 consociational executive in 1963, after just three years of  operation.58 Virtually 
all Greek Cypriots believe that executive to have been “unworkable,”59 which helps to 
explains why centripetal ideas have gained traction among some Greek Cypriot lead-
ers and civil society groups. The “Greek Cypriot nightmare,” as Kofi  Annan put it dur-
ing UN led negotiations in 2003, is that the executive institutions of  a future united 
Cyprus will break down in the same way that the 1960 arrangements did, this time 
paving the way for the formal recognition of  the TRNC.60 The Turkish Cypriots have 
their own bad dreams about the 1960–1963 breakdown, one in which they see them-
selves as the main victims. In their view, the breakdown was followed by the monopo-
lization of  the institutions of  the Republic of  Cyprus by Greek Cypriots, and by the 
isolation of  the Turkish Cypriots in small enclaves until Turkey came to their aid in 
1974. The Turkish Cypriot nightmare is that the breakdown of  a settlement will lead 
57 One of  the ironies of  the Northern Ireland Agreement is that executive formation via the d’Hondt PS 
mechanism was chosen by the two leading moderate parties, the SDLP and the UUP, even though they 
were the largest parties in each bloc, and had the numbers in the Assembly to opt, along with the small 
cross-ethnic Alliance party, for a centripetal minimum-winning coalition of  moderate parties. It was the 
SDLP leader, John Hume, who proposed a d’Hondt-based PS grand coalition, and his UUP counterpart, 
David Trimble, accepted. These leaders were concerned about being outbid if  they restricted the coalition 
to their parties, and were heavily influenced in their thinking by what happened to a previous moderates-
only coalition—the Sunningdale executive, which had been established in 1973–74 but lasted only five 
months. The hardline parties in each bloc in 1998—the DUP and Sinn Féin—were minority parties and 
therefore the main beneficiaries of  an inclusive approach. They played no role in discussions on the exec-
utive in the lead up to the 1998 Agreement: the DUP boycotted the negotiations, while Sinn Féin focused 
on issues relating to all-Ireland and security dimensions, McGarry & O’Leary supra note 13.
58 staNley kyrIakIdes, CyPrus: CoNstItutIoNalIsm aNd CrIsIs IN goverNmeNt (1968).
59 Id.; P. g. PolyvIou, CyPrus: CoNflICt aNd NegotIatIoNs 1960–1980 (1980).
60 Report of  the Secretary-General on his Mission of  Good Offices in Cyprus, U.N. Security Council, S/398 
(2003).
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to a reversion to the current status quo, where they lack recognition or, even worse, 
to the predicament they found themselves in before 1974. This is why most Turkish 
Cypriots prefer recognized independence over the risks of  consociational reunion.61 
Having discussed the functional benefits of  a PS executive over the alternatives in gen-
eral terms, the paper ends by explaining three Cyprus-specific functional advantages 
of  a PS consociational executive over the 1960 consociational model.
3.1. A ‘pragmatic’ grand coalition
Although Horowitz and many others use the experience of  Cyprus’s 1960 executive as 
an indictment of  consociational grand coalitions, the 1960 executive was not a grand 
coalition (or a PS grand coalition) of  the main Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot  par-
ties. This distinction matters. The 1960 executive was a majoritarian consociation, 
i.e. a consociation that involved two leaders—a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish 
Cypriot vice-president—chosen by separate electoral rolls and with majority support 
in their respective communities.62 Each leader was responsible for selecting his cabinet 
ministers, on a 70:30 (Greek Cypriot:Turkish Cypriot) ratio. The result was a dyadic 
executive comprised of  a monolithic Greek Cypriot bloc and a monolithic Turkish 
Cypriot bloc, which confronted each other on every issue, including those that had 
little direct bearing on ethnic politics such as taxation.
Because a grand coalition would involve, in contrast, all major parties in each com-
munity, it would open up important prospects for cross-cutting political alignments, 
ironically of  the type that Horowitz appears to favor (but which the alternative vote, 
his preferred majoritarian electoral system, seems designed to thwart). An advantage 
of  Cyprus in relation to other deeply divided places like Northern Ireland is that each 
of  its two ethnic blocs is also importantly divided along left and right ideological lines. 
Indeed, the division of  Greek Cypriots into left and right ideological pillars is as strong 
as those divisions that gave rise to consociational systems in some western European 
democracies, and is in part a legacy of  a violent right-wing coup d’état in 1974. Matters 
are not quite as polarized among Turkish Cypriots, but they are also clearly and stably 
divided into a socialist left wing party (the CTP) and two nationalist and right wing 
parties (UBP and DP), with no centrist parties between them. A PS grand coalition 
would promote inter-ethnic alliances on both the left and right.
Relatedly, a grand coalition would expose the fact that each of  the two blocs is 
divided into constitutional moderates and hardliners. The moderate-hardline divi-
sion is not exactly the same as the left-right division, with the right-of-center DISY 
61 alexaNdros lordos, erol kaymak & NathalIe toCCI, a PeoPle’s PeaCe IN CyPrus: testINg PuBlIC oPINIoN oN the 
oPtIoNs for a ComPreheNsIve settlemeNt (2009).
62 According to the Constitution of  the Republic of  Cyprus (art. 39) a winning candidate for the position of  
president (or vice-president) needs more than 50% of  the votes in his/her community voting separately. 
If  no candidate meets this requirement in the first round, a run-off  is held a week later between the 
two leading first-round candidates. The first elections took place simultaneously in December 13, 1959. 
Makarios won in a two person election while Küçuk was elected unopposed: see Protes Proedrikes Ekloges 
[First Presidential Elections], Press aNd INformatIoN servICe, available at http://www.proedrikes2013.gov.
cy/elections_1959-2008/elections_1959.htm.
 at U
niversity of K
ent on February 12, 2016
http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Power-sharing in a re-united Cyprus: Centripetal coalitions vs. proportional sequential coalitions 869
occasionally taking positions on the constitutional issue that are more moderate than 
leftist AKEL, including on the referendum on the Annan plan, which DISY supported 
but AKEL did not. One of  the most injurious effects of  the winner take all electoral 
system currently used to elect the President of  Cyprus (and Greek Cypriot leader) is 
that it has exacerbated rivalries between AKEL and DISY, and has made each of  them 
dependent on the support of  the Greek Cypriot’s third party, DIKO, which is radically 
ethnocentric on the constitutional issue. It was the alliance between DIKO and AKEL, 
for example, that partly explains the latter’s opposition to the UN’s Annan Plan, and, 
as discussed, AKEL leader Christofias’s reluctance to make concessions to Talat before 
the latter’s election defeat in 2010. A  grand coalition based on a PS mechanism 
would mean that DIKO would no longer enjoy a pivotal role in executive formation, 
and would make AKEL and DISY independent to forge informal alliances with each 
other within the government on constitutional issues. Indeed, a PS executive would 
produce a strong majority in the Council of  Ministers that is likely to be pragmatic on 
constitutional issues. Given current levels of  support, AKEL+CTP+DISY would have 
seven of  ten ministries under Model 1 (Table 2) and eight of  twelve ministries under 
Model 2 (Table 3).
3.2. No monolithic veto
A widely recognized reason for the collapse of  the 1960 consociation was that it 
gave a powerful executive veto to both the president and vice-president. This veto was 
employed in October 1961 by Vice-President Fazıl Küçuk to prevent the integration 
of  the army, a step President Makarios responded to by scrapping plans for any army, 
which helped polarize the blocs and left the field to rival ethnically based paramilitary 
movements, contributing to conflict. The veto thus directly and indirectly exacerbated 
relations between the communities.
To address perennial Greek Cypriot concerns about this monolithic veto, the 
UN’s Annan Plan in 2004 proposed a collegial presidential council with four Greek 
Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots. A qualified majority of  the six, including at least 
one member from each side, was to be required to pass any measure (art. 5.1(b)). This 
was intended to reduce the use of  vetoes as these would now require a no from both 
Turkish Cypriots or from three of  the four Greek Cypriots.63 The problem with this 
solution, however, was that under the Annan Plan’s executive formation rule—the 
election of  a single list of  ministers by a majority in the Senate including two fifths 
of  Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Senators—it was possible for a single party to 
win all of  each community’s seats on the presidential council. In short, an informal 
party veto could have imitated the dyarchic veto that existed in 1960. By contrast, a 
PS grand coalition would be much less likely to produce a monolithic political group in 
either community. The fissiparous nature of  a PS coalition, seen by centripetalists as a 
weakness, would here help to strengthen moderates. As it would virtually guarantee 
the moderate parties that Horowitz favors at least one ministerial seat in each commu-
nity, and in most cases considerably more than this (see Tables 2 and 3), these parties 
63 It would be even more difficult to invoke a veto in a larger executive, as we have assumed in Table 1.
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would be in a position, under the Annan Plan’s veto formula, to prevent frivolous uses 
of  the veto, while ensuring the veto was still present to protect each community from 
blatant abuses.
3.3. Improved control over legislation
The third advantage of  a PS executive over the 1960 presidential consociation (and 
the centripetal presidency proposed in 2008–10), is that a PS executive would be based 
on an “oversized” parliamentary coalition. The prospects of  executive driven legisla-
tion, including budgets, receiving parliamentary approval would be enhanced. A con-
sensus in a PS executive would guarantee legislative approval, regardless of  whether 
such approval required simple, special or concurrent majorities. Another way to put 
this argument is that as it will be inevitable that any united Cyprus legislature will 
be loaded with special majority decision-making rules, to protect the Turkish Cypriot 
minority in particular, it will be necessary for the government to be as oversized as 
possible if  it is to control the legislative agenda. As Lijphart has argued, the need for 
cabinets to be large enough to overcome legislative veto-points is a key reason for hav-
ing oversized coalitions.64
As a united Cyprus will be federal, a PS parliamentary executive would also act as a 
constraint on conflict between the two federal chambers, and between federal institu-
tions and those of  the constituent states and municipalities, given that the same par-
ties are likely to be prominent in all of these.
In contrast, presidential executives, including the 1960 model, are not guaran-
teed legislative majorities. The centripetal collegial presidency proposed in 2008–
10 would likely have had only minority support in both chambers of  the federal 
legislature.65
In spite of  these multiple advantages, a PS executive, like other types of  executive, 
cannot guarantee against breakdown. But a further way to protect against dysfunc-
tionality is to negotiate agreed deadlock breaking mechanisms (DBMs) that come 
into play when vetoes have been invoked on matters vital to the state’s functioning. 
One way to proceed is to take advantage of  the fact that the united Cyprus will be 
an independent state, rather than a region of  a state, like Northern Ireland. All inde-
pendent states with parliamentary systems, whether based on PS executives or not, 
require “symbolic” heads of  state, endowed, at least in theory, with deadlock-breaking 
powers, such as the ability to resolve a stalemate in government by calling elections. 
A re-united Cyprus will require two heads of  state, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish 
Cypriot, who will most likely rotate in office temporally on a two to one basis, and 
who could be elected on the basis of  “weighted cross-voting.” This presidency could be 
entrusted with breaking executive deadlocks on vital issues if  both its members agree. 
If  they cannot agree, the deadlock could be referred to the country’s Supreme Court, 
64 See lIJPhart, supra note 18, at 202–203.
65 One answer to this is to elect the other institutions by centripetal electoral systems also, but there is virtu-
ally no chance of  this happening, as Horowitz acknowledges. See Horowitz, Constitutional Design, supra 
note 6.
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which, following the provisions of  the 2004 Annan Plan and of  the 1960 constitu-
tion, is likely to have an uneven number of  judges, with an external judge agreed to by 
both communities in the swing position. The Annan Plan and the 1960 constitution, 
however, lacked the prior, and more desirable, domestic and democratic arbitration 
mechanism suggested here.
Such a DBM would establish a “triple lock” against executive dysfunctionality. A con-
sensus in the Council of  Ministers—facilitated by the split veto described above—or at 
the level of  the non-executive presidency, or in the Supreme Court, would be sufficient 
to break any deadlock in the executive. The triple lock would provide incentives for the 
deadlock to be broken early in the process: vetoing ministers would have an incentive 
to compromise knowing that the presidency or courts could endorse a deal that would 
be more sub-optimal for them, while the presidency would have an incentive to put its 
stamp on the measure under discussion rather than leave it to the courts. The election 
of  moderate Mustafa Akıncı to the Turkish Cypriot leadership in April 2015 provides 
an opportunity, if  a settlement is reached, to extend the current leaders’ mandate, 
for them to guarantee the implementation of  the settlement in its first years; such 
an arrangement will be more legıtımate if  the joint presidents assume primarily sym-
bolic and arbitration roles. As both Akıncı and Anastasiades are widely respected and 
trusted across communal lines, the joint presidency will also become more acceptable 
to both communities helping to assure a positive result in a settlement referendum.
In the long-term, recurring deadlocks either in the council of  ministers or presi-
dency could also give rise to fresh elections, to protect at least against unpopular uses 
of  the veto power; otherwise both the inclusive executive and presidency should have 
fixed terms.
4. Conclusion
There are several other reasons why power-sharing is more likely to be successful in a 
reunited Cyprus, ceteris paribus, than in decolonized Cyprus, and although these are 
not directly related to the merits of  PS coalitions, some of  them are related to con-
sociational theory. Unlike in 1960, a reunited Cyprus will provide for considerable 
“segmental autonomy” through federalism. This will shift important decisions from 
the federal PS executive, where agreement will be necessary, to more homogeneous 
constituent state arenas, where it will not be. And a reunited Cyprus will be in the EU, 
which will also relieve its decision-making institutions in relation to 1960.
Furthermore, unlike in 1960, when the Zurich–London accords were imposed on 
a reluctant Greek Cypriot leadership, any future Cyprus settlement will be an exercise 
in co-determination, through separate and simultaneous referenda, again squarely 
in keeping with principles of  consociational “democracy,” in which accords should 
be agreed to democratically rather than imposed. While the Greek Cypriot leadership 
moved quickly after 1960 to undermine the constitution, it will be more difficult to do 
that this time, as the constitution will have the imprimatur of  both communities. A 
referendum, of  course, also makes a settlement more difficult to attain.
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If  the two sides in Cyprus cannot agree on an open-ended PS coalition, i.e., one that 
will be in place until it is changed by a constitutional amendment by and concurrent 
consent of  the two communities, they could decide to opt for a temporary PS coalition, 
for one or two terms after a settlement. This would mimic the South African precedent 
of  1994–99 and would have attractions for Greek Cypriots in particular, although 
perhaps not the Turkish Cypriots.
Agreement on a PS coalition could, as we have argued, make a yes vote more likely 
in referendums on each side, as it is likely to weaken opposition to a settlement among 
hardliners, while retaining the support of  moderates. A PS coalition also has a reason-
able chance of  maintaining stability. On both counts, it has advantages over a centri-
petal coalition of  moderates. Of  course, a settlement and affirmative referendums will 
depend not just on agreement on power-sharing, but on agreement on other contro-
versial issues as well.
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